We provide a model of privacy in which data collection requires consumers' consent and consumers are fully aware of the consequences of such consent. Nonetheless, the market equilibrium is characterized by excessive collection of personal information and the resulting loss of privacy by consumers compared to the social optimum. This result is due to firms' incentives to exploit negative privacy externalities among consumers, where disclosure of information by some consumers enables an inference of information about other consumers with the use of data analytics. We also discuss the role of data brokerage firms in the aggregation of information and provide implications for privacy policies.
they are fully aware of the deal each of them is making? In other words, is it enough to educate consumers about the exact costs of sharing their personal information in order to protect their privacy rights? Do firms collect too much or too little personal data from social perspective?
To address these questions, we develop a model of privacy in which data collection requires consumers' consent and consumers are fully aware of the consequences of such consent.
Nonetheless, the market equilibrium is characterized by excessive collection of personal information and the loss of privacy by consumers compared to the social optimum. This result is due to firms' incentives to exploit negative privacy externalities among consumers, where disclosure of information by some consumers enables an inference of information about other consumers with the use of data analytics. We also discuss the role of data brokerage firms in the aggregation of information and provide implications for privacy policies.
In particular, we consider the interactions between web users and web-based applications/content providers whose business model consists in monetizing personal digital trails by selling them to the so-called data broker industry which is largely operating behind a veil of secrecy. 4 A primary goal of our research is to provide an economic rationale for each user's voluntary consent to the websites for their uncommitted and possibly secondary use of the collected information including sale of data to third parties. There are certainly reasons for this behavior based on non-transparency or consumers' lack of understanding about websites' data use policy. For instance, privacy notices are "just too long for people to read through ..., making it difficult for most people to understand what they are signing up to." 5 Alternatively, it could be due to consumers' myopic and time-inconsistent preference that is responsible for such behavior. 6 We make no assumption of any bounded rationality or consumers' lack of knowledge about the website's data use, thereby not resorting to consumers' 4 See the Staff Report for Chairman Rockefeller (December 18, 2013) entitled "A Review of the Data Broker Industry: Collection, Use, and Sale of Consumer Data for Marketing Purposes" for a detailed description of the secretive nature of the data brokerage industry. 5 Attributed to Australian Privacy Commissioner Timothy Pilgrim. See Corinne Reichert, "Many Privacy Policies Are Long, Complex: OAIC," ZD Net, August 15, 2013, available at http://www.zdnet.com/article/many-privacy-policies-are-long-complex-oaic/ 6 See Dellavigna and Malmendier (2004) for such a model. In our setup, the enticing "free" services can be considered as "leisure goods" that provide immediate benefits to consumers, but imposes delayed costs of privacy loss. Another explanation put forward is that the costs of privacy loss are at best nebulous and intangible, which leads to consumers' consistent underestimation of them. myopia or to limited information. Instead, we assume very rational consumers who are fully aware of all the bargains they are making and make optimal choices. Even so, we show that each consumer can find it individually rational to accept the third party use of their personal data and that in general there is socially excessive monetizing of personal digital data.
Our key driving mechanism is so-called information externalities which mean that some people's decision to share information allows to know more about others who choose not to share. This is because data analytics make it possible to infer useful information about people who did not offer personal data from those who disclosed information. One example illustrating such a mechanism is a study by MIT students who showed that men's sexual orientation can be predicted by an analysis of social network sites such as Facebook. This is possible because data analytics reveal that homosexual men have proportionally more gay friends than straight men, which allows one to predict men's sexual orientation based solely on the sexualities of their friends. 7 One important takeaway from this example is that "you don't have control over your information" 8 even though you do not divulge of your personal information, if other people do. 9 Note that if information is used by a benevolent entity who maximizes consumer surplus or social welfare, there is no reason to expect that the afore-mentioned information externalities would adversely affect those who do not consent on collection and use of their personal data.
However, in this paper, we consider firms who cannot commit to such ideal use of private data.
This assumption perfectly makes sense for data-brokerage firms which operate in a completely opaque manner without any direct relationship with consumers. The data brokers cannot commit the use of purchased data to be of service to consumers. This assumption is also appropriate in the monopoly part of our model where we try to capture a "Big Brother" with large amount of data who cannot commit to a particular form of data use. 10 To illustrate the basic mechanism, we first consider a simple monopoly set-up with big data which does not need to sell data to brokerage firms. We identify a new type of distortion that motivates the monopolist to monetize personal data more than a social planner who 10 Later in the section on policy implications, we consider the possibility for a firm to build reputation for good use of data. maximizes social welfare. This is primarily because the social marginal cost of serving one extra consumer is higher than the monopolist's marginal cost of doing so in the presence of negative information externalities. The intuition is as follows. When one extra consumer provides her personal information by patronizing the monopolist's web-service requiring the sharing of personal information, it makes all non-consumers' reservation utility decline in the presence of negative information externalities. While the social planner cares about this utility loss to non-consumers, the monopolist does not. Instead, the monopolist cares about the effect of an additional consumer on its ability to extract more surplus from existing consumers by reducing their reservation utility. However, this is of no concern to the social planner because it is just a pure transfer. Taken together, the monopolist reacts to a lower private marginal cost to serve the marginal consumer relative to the social planner. Hence, the monopolist can have socially excessive incentives to monetize personal data. Now we consider how these negative information externalities work at the level of websites.
Let us consider a continuum of heterogeneous websites with respect to their content value.
Each website simultaneously decides its own entry and subsequently its business model. Note that once personal data are sold to the brokerage firms, consumers lose control of their use and the brokerage firms (and the advertising firms who buy data from them) have little incentive to internalize the nuisance from its use to consumers. In our model, consumers are fully aware of this so that each website needs to compensate for the expected utility loss when inducing consumer participation. Hence, each website has no incentives to collect data alone due to its small customer base.
However, we show that the emergence of data brokerage firms that purchase and aggregate data from multiple websites can restore incentives to collect data. Once a large amount of data on many consumers is gathered and sold to data brokers, it can generate negative externalities to even those consumers who refuse the sale of personal data. These negative information externalities relax the individual rationality constraint of each consumer by worsening the reservation utility compared to a benchmark where personal data is not sold by the individual.
Although each consumer finds it individually rational to accept the sale of his personal data, he/she gets worse off in equilibrium. That is, what drives our result is coordination failure among consumers.
As the more websites adopt the business model of monetizing personal data, the larger negative information externalities are generated among consumers. From the perspective of potential entrants (websites), these incumbent websites are generating positive spillovers to them because each of potential entrants now expects the higher ex post profit due to the reduced compensation for the consumer nuisance. As a result, even without any business stealing effects as in Mankiw and Whinston (1986) , we find an equilibrium in which too many websites enter to collect and sell personal data and all consumers consent to data collection and sale of their personal data.
Our research thus has important implications for the recent policy debate regarding data brokerage and privacy. European Commission, for instance, introduced the data protection policies which require websites to get consumer approval for transferring personal data to third parties (such as data brokerage firms). Similarly, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission passed a new rule (by the 3-2 party line vote) that requires Internet providers such as AT&T, Verizon, and Comcast to obtain their customers' explicit consent before using or sharing sensitive data with third parties such as marketing firms, which was their source of revenue by turning customers' behavioral data into better information basis for targeted advertising. 11 These policies would have some effect on naive consumers by alerting them to be aware of such data transfer. However, such an individualistic approach may be limited in addressing the negative information externalities problem even if consumers are well-informed and make fully rational decisions.
As in our paper, several legal scholars pointed out the public good nature of privacy and warned of the ineffectiveness of the "notice and choice" approach as a solution to the unwanted privacy invasion. In essence, the notice-and-choice approach is based on the promise of individual control of disclosure and dissemination of information and thus inadequate to address the externality problem. MacCarthy (2011), for instance, argues that in the presence of negative information externalities with information leakage by some potentially harming others, the reliance on individual consent to determine the collection and use of personal information will be ineffective. In a similar vein, Fairfield and Engel (2015) characterize privacy as a public good because "[a]n individual who is careless with data exposes not only extensive information about herself, but also others as well." They thus call for a collective choice approach to address the privacy issue. 12 Our paper formalizes these ideas.
To mitigate or remove the coordination problem arising from the negative information externalities, we propose a policy remedy based on a menu approach which allows each consumer to choose among different options of data collection/use. The menu we propose is different from the usual one in that the firm must charge the same price across different options. For instance, consider a firm that offers two different websites. Then, the firm should offer the following two different options at the same price: (i) data use with integration of data from both websites and (ii) data use without integration. Then, depending on each consumer's expectation about the firm's reputation in its data use, each consumer may find it optimal to choose integrated use (non-integrated use) if the firm's reputation is good (bad), regardless of the decisions taken by other people. In other words, our proposed remedy can induce consumers to coordinate, in dominant strategy, on the best option depending on the reputation of the firm in question.
Lastly, let us briefly discuss the literature closely related to this article. Most academic work to date assumes that the data is already available and possessed by a third party. Montes, Sand-Zantman, and Valletti (2015) investigate the value of personal information in a Hotelling-type duopoly model. They consider a game in which competing firms can acquire information about consumers' characteristics, which enables them to practice personalized pricing while consumers at the same time can pay a privacy cost to avoid such price discrimination. They analyze the effects of such price discrimination and privacy costs on competition and social welfare. Once again, they just assume that such consumer information is already available from an upstream data supplier and do not consider the mechanism in which such data is collected and aggregated. In our model, we show how the emergence of data brokerage firms can facilitate the collection of such data through websites whose business model is to 12 Earlier Hirsch (2006) pointed out the similarity between privacy regulation and environmental laws. acquire consumer data. 13 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop a model of monopolist to illustrate the basic mechanism of negative information externalities. Section 3 extends the analysis to a model with a continuum of small websites. We consider a scenario in which each individual firm's scale of operation is too small to justify the independent use of "data sale" as a business model, yet show how the existence of data brokerage firms can serve as a channel of information aggregation and enables the emergence of data sale as a collective business model. Section 4 discusses implications for optimal privacy policies and Section 5 concludes.
Monopoly Model
We first consider the simple set-up of a monopolist to illustrate the basic mechanism. There is a mass one of consumers who consume digital products delivered online, simply referred to as 'content' hereafter. Consumers' valuation for the service provided by the monopolist is given by u, which is assumed to be distributed over [u, u] with distribution function F and density f . The monopolistic content provider can collect consumers' personal data in the process of providing its service, which can be potentially utilized for other purposes. For instance, it can be used for targeted advertising or promotion of other ancillary services.
We assume that consumers incur a nuisance cost of "privacy loss" when personal information is used for such purposes. There can be many sources of such utility loss. For instance, there could be direct economic losses due to personalize pricing enabled by the detailed knowledge of personal preferences. We can also think of a variety of psychological reasons for negative feelings about privacy loss. A newly released smartphone app called Google Trips, promoted to provide a "personalized tour guide in your pocket," is a case in point. The modus operandi of this app developed by Google is to "use what it already knows about you, based on data it has collected from your Gmail account, and combines it with established features from its other offerings, like Destinations, and its large database of crowd-sourced reviews," which led a New York Times reviewer for this app to comment that 13 Bataineh et al. (2016) adopt a two-sided market approach to analyze how a data monetizing platform can be used to generate higher profit for both data providers and data consumers compared to other market mechanisms. However, they do not consider privacy issues and information externalities in the provision of personal data. "It's Kind of Creepy." 14 We assume that the extent of knowledge about a consumer depends not only on the information directly collected from the consumer but also on the amount of information revealed by other consumers because the monopolist can do data mining to indirectly infer information about the consumer. In particular, we assume that the monopolist may infer some information about the consumer even if he does not patronize the content provider. For instance, we can imagine that the firm may have from the beginning some information about consumer i, which they obtained from data available from off-line or on-line using public or private sources. Then, they can always find some consumer i whose personal data matches consumer i (up to the information they have about consumer i). Hence, even if consumer i does not use the service, the fact that there are several consumers similar to i who use the service may allow some inference about consumer i.
We thus represent a consumer's nuisance costs as ψ 1 (m) and ψ 0 (m) respectively, depending on whether the consumer uses the service or not, where m is the mass of consumers who use the service. The nuisance costs are increasing in m, that is, ψ k (m) > 0, where k = 0, 1, and ψ 1 (m) > ψ 0 (m) with ψ 0 (0) = 0. When the personal information collected is utilized, the monopolist can generate additional revenue of R(m), with R (m) > 0. To focus on the consumers' coordination failure and negative externalities in the nuisance costs, we assume that R(m) also represents social benefits. As we are concerned with a digital product/service, the marginal cost of the content is assumed to be zero.
The timing of the game is as follows. At the beginning of the game, the monopolist commits to a privacy regime with the adoption of a business model of "pure content pricing" or "personal data use". In the pure content pricing regime, the monopolist commits not to collect personal information or not to use it for advertising or other purpose of ancillary revenue generation including data sale to a third party. In this case, privacy of all consumers is protected and there is no nuisance cost for consumers. In the personal data use regime, consumers make rational decisions with the understanding that his personal information can be used by the monopolist and subsequently he is subject to a nuisance cost.
Social Optimum
We first analyze socially optimal outcome as a benchmark in which the social planner chooses the allocation. Namely, he or she chooses u the cutoff type of consumers such that all consumers whose valuation exceeds or equal to u use the service. The first-best outcome does not depend on wheher the planner has complete information or incomplete information about types. The mass of consumers who use the service is given by m = 1 − F (u). Welfare given a cutoff type u is given by
The welfare-maximizing cutoff type u can be derived by the following first order condition.
which is equivalent to
The RHS of (1) represents the social marginal cost (SM C) of nuisance when additional user joins the customer base. There are three channels through which SM C is affected when an additional user starts to use the content service. First, the marginal consumer's status change from a non-consumer to a consumer directly affects his nuisance cost by (ψ 1 − ψ 0 ).
Additionally, a new consumer inflicts externalities not only on the consumer group he joins, but also on the non-consumer group he leaves behind. The nuisance cost of an existing consumer changes by ψ 1 as a new consumer joins; thereby the aggregate change for the consumer group is equal to (1 − F (u))ψ 1 . In addition, the nuisance cost of an existing non-consumer also changes by ψ 0 with the aggregate effect being F (u)ψ 0 .
Monopoly
We now derive the monopolist's optimal regime choice and price.
Personal Data Usage Regime
Given the monopolist's price p, let u be the cutoff type of consumers who are indifferent between using the service or not. For the cut-off type u, the IR can be written as
where −ψ 0 (1 − F (u)) is the reservation utility of type u consumer. Therefore, the monopolist will solve the following problem:
The first order condition for profit maximization is
This is equivalent to
Note that if we consider the standard monopoly model without additional source of revenue from personal data use and nuisance costs, that is, ψ 1 (m) = ψ 0 (m) = R(m) = 0, condition (2) reduces to the standard monopoly condition:
where the LHS represents the virtual type u v , which is assumed to be increasing with u.
For the monopolist in our model, the LHS of (2) is changed into R + u v to reflect the additional revenue R . The RHS of (2) represents the private marginal cost (P M C) of nuisance.
A comparison of P M C in (2) with SM C in (1) indicates that there is another source of distortion in our model. More specifically, the difference between these two is given by
That is, we have
This new type of distortion we identify can be explained in the following way. When one extra consumer is served and his data adds to the monopolist's database, it inflicts additional negative externality to F (u) measure of non-consumers even though they do not use the monopolist's content. This effect on non-consumers' reservation utility is F (u)ψ 0 . While the social planner cares about this negative externality, the monopolist does not because they are non-consumers. Instead, the monopolist cares about the effect of an additional consumer on its ability to extract surplus from existing consumers. However, this is no concern to the social planner because it is just a pure transfer. More specifically, in order to induce one more additional consumer the monopolist's price needs to be adjusted below by (ψ 1 − ψ 0 ) to compensate the differences in the nuisance cost change. Note that as additional consumer also negatively affects non-consumers and reduces the reservation value of the marginal consumer, the price compensation needs to be only (ψ 1 − ψ 0 ), not ψ 1 . As a result, the negative profit impact via a reduced price to the inframarginal consumers is given by
whereas the social planner only cares about the real impact on the inframarginal consumers which is (1 − F (u))ψ 1 . This creates an additional difference of (1 − F (u))ψ 0 ; the extent to which the reservation utility of the marginal consumer is reduced with an additional consumer (ψ 0 ) represents more ability to extract surplus from consumers for the monopolist in the amount of (1 − F (u))ψ 0 , but this is a transfer which does not figure in the social planner's calculus.
In summary, the social planner cares about the real nuisance effect of the addition of a marginal consumer on non-consumers (with a measure of F (u)) while the monopolist cares cares only about its ability to extract surplus from consumers (with a measure of 1 − F (u)) through its effect on the marginal consumer's willingness to pay by reducing the reservation utility. Taken together, the total difference between SM C and P M C becomes
Thus, this type of distortion leads to the monopolist to serve too many consumers and the extent to which the monopolist's decision departs from the social planner's depends on the additional consumer's impact on the reservation utility.
The effect of this distortion is in the opposite direction of the standard monopoly result that the monopolist serves too few consumers. The overall effect thus depends on the relative magnitudes of these two opposing effects. If the negative externality effect of making the monopolist to serve more than socially optimal number of consumers is greater than the standard monopoly distortion, too many consumers can be served by the monopolist compared to the socially efficient level.
Let u * and u F B be the monopoly cutoff and the first-best cutoff types, respectively, and m * ≡ 1 − F (u * ) and m F B ≡ 1 − F (u F B ) be the respectively corresponding measures of consumers served. Then, we have the following proposition that summarize thus far analysis.
Proposition 1 (Monopolist vs. Social Planner)
(i) The monopolist serves more consumers than the social planner, i.e., u * < u F B (or, m * > m F B ) if and only if
(ii) The monopolist serves all consumers while the social planner does not if
. This means that the stated result will be obtained under a sufficiently low reservation utility due to the negative marginal externality.
To illustrate the result, consider a simple parametric example in which u is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and R(m) = rm with ψ 1 (m) = κm and ψ 0 (m) = ξκm,where ξ ∈ (0, 1). Later we will provide more micro-foundation for these nuisance costs from a CES type functional form. In this case, the SM C and P M C are respectively given by
with SM C − P M C = ψ 0 = κξ. Then, the socially optimal level of consumption and the equilibrium level of consumption are characterized by
;
We have m * > m F B if and only if 2ξκ[1 + κ(1 − ξ)] > 1 + r. As is clearly seen from the explicit expressions of m * and m F B , if ξ = 0, we have m * < m F B due to the standard monopoly distortion. However, for a sufficiently high κξ, the opposite result can be obtained, which is also confirmed by the fact that the LHS, 2ξκ[1 + κ(1 − ξ)], is increasing in κ and ξ for all ξ ∈ (0, 1).
Pure Content Pricing Regime
In the pure content pricing regime in which privacy is protected and no personal data is utilized, we have the standard result, where the virtual type is equalized to marginal cost, which is zero.
Let the solution to the above problem be denoted as u * and the corresponding number of consumers as m * = 1 − F ( u * ). Then, the monopolist's maximized profit without data collection is given by
Monopolist's Choice of Business Model
Suppose that the monopolist can choose between pure content pricing model with no data collection and data collection model (we may extend to analyze how much private data to utilize in an agreement with users, as the case of intensity of use analysis, but for now, let us it fixed).
As we already analyzed in Subsection 1.2.1, the profit maximizing choice of u, denoted by u * , is determined by (2) . Recall that the corresponding number of consumers as m * = 1 − F (u * ) and the monopolist's maximized profit with data collection is given by
Now suppose that the monopolist adopts the pure content pricing business model without collecting any information or by committing not to utilize private information for any other purposes. As we analyzed in Subsection 2.2.2, the monopolist's optimal choice u * is determined by u v = 0 the monopolist's maximized profit with data collection is given by Proof. By the revealed preference argument, we have Then, we can easily derive that
and m * = 1 2 
the monopolist adopts a data collection model and there will be too much data collection and loss of privacy. Here we can interpret κ as a scale parameter. We normalize the number of consumers at 1, but κ can be reinterpreted as the size of market. There will be such r that satisfies the above condition if 2ξκ > 1. This means that we will have too much data collection and loss of privacy as long as the marginal externality intensity ξ and/or the size of market κ is large enough. Even if this condition as of today may not be satisfied, as the data mining advances further (so that ξ increases enough) our society will suffer more from excessive data collection and loss of privacy.
Below we illustrate when the data collection by the monopolist is adopted over the pure content pricing model and when such a choice is socially inefficient. In the space of (ξ, κ), we have total four sets I, II, III and IV depending on the business model choice and on the socially excessive data collection or not. Set I denotes the parameter constellation of (ξ, κ) where the monopolist adopts the data collection model but such choice is not leading to socially excessive privacy loss. However, Set II captures the situation in which such data collection is socially harmful. This occurs when ξ is large enough while k is not that high. This is because the higher k means the greater standard monopoly distortion so that the monopolist ends up not serving enough consumers from the welfare perspective. Set III and Set IV denote the parameter set where the monopolist uses only the content price, with commitment if possible to no data collection. Set IV represents the set of excessive data collection if the monopolist had adopted the data monetizing business model. 
, the monopolist's business model is to provide free content in exchange for personal data and derive all revenues from targeted advertising, i.e.,
R(·).
This can explain the prevalence of websites providing free services. 15 In equilibrium, too many consumers are served, which is equivalent to too many consumers giving up their privacy: too much personal data are collected and used.
Data Brokerage Firms and Big Data
In the previous section, we considered a monopoly website and its incentives to collect persona data as a business model. We showed the monopolist website may have excessive incentives to collect personal data with the resulting loss of privacy for consumers compared to the social optimum. The main mechanism responsible for this outcome was the gap between the monopolist's private marginal cost of serving one more consumer and the social marginal cost of doing so, which is due to negative privacy externalities.
In this section, we consider an alternative mechanism at the level of websites. As a building block, we consider monopolistic websites that have no incentives to collect data alone due to its small customer base. We show that the emergence of data brokerage firms that purchase and aggregate data from websites can restore incentives to collect data.
Consider there is a mass one of monopolistic websites in their own market niche and a mass one of homogeneous consumers. Consumers multihome. Websites are heterogeneous in terms of the value that their content generates to consumers. Let v denote the value of a website's content to each homogeneous consumer. v follows a distribution function G with density g over the interval [v, v] with v > 0. We assume that all websites have the same fixed cost of entry K > 0.
We assume that in the absence of brokerage industry, each website has no incentive to collect data since the scale of their data is too small and thus adopts the pure content pricing model. Now consider the presence of data brokerage firms who can aggregate data from individual websites and use big data to better utilize collected information. Let R(n) denote 15 In our parametric example, this condition can be written as
the aggregate revenue of the data brokers where n is the measure of websites who feed the personal information about their users to data brokers when all consumers in each monopolistic market use the corresponding website. Let ψ(n) denote the aggregate nuisance to the consumers in such a case. We assume that both the revenue and the nuisance increase with n, R (n) > 0 and ψ (n) > 0.
We also assume some scale economy in data brokerage such that
Hence, if no other website sells data, a single website has no incentive to collect and sell personal data instead of adopting a pure content pricing model.. 16 For expositional clarity, we will often consider a simple case in which both R(n) and ψ(n) are linear with R(0) = ψ(0) = 0.
Then, the above assumption implies that R(n) < ψ(n) for any n. However, we do not need such strong assumption and our results are also obtained when R(n) > ψ(n) for some interval of n.
We consider a three-stage game with the following timing.
• Stage 1: each website simultaneously decides whether to incur the fixed cost of entry
• Stage 2: The websites which entered decide simultaneously their business model (including a price) and make offers.
• Stage 3: Consumers decide which websites to use among those already entered and made an offer.
Competition when all websites monetize data
Consider stage 2 and suppose that all websites of measure n use the business model of data sale (supplemented with a content pricing). We below characterize the equilibrium in which every consumer uses all the websites.
Let j and k represent two different websites with v j and v k . Let p j and p k the content price they charge. Since all websites are identical in terms of the nuisance they generate from data sale, the following equation must be satisfied for any pair of (j, k) in equilibrium:
Hence, a consumer's payoff in equilibrium is nv(n) − ψ(n).
Suppose that all consumers consume all websites and consider the deviation of consumer i. Let ψ(n , n) represent the nuisance of consumer i depending on the measure n ≤ n of websites he consumes given that all the other consumers consume all the websites of measure n. We assume that ψ(n , n) is increasing in each element. For instance, ψ(0, n) represent the nuisance he experiences even if he does not consume any website. We have ψ(n) = ψ(n, n) and ψ(0, 0) = 0.
Then, a necessary condition for v(n) to constitute an equilibrium is that the following incentive constraint is satisfied for any n < n:
The RHS of the inequality represents the deviation payoff and its first term is linear in n .
If ψ(n , n) is concave, then RHS is convex in n and its maximum is attained either at n = 0 or at n = n. Therefore, the incentive constraint is satisfied for any n ≤ n if (IC : 0, n) is satisfied:
Of course, in equilibrium, the above inequality must be satisfied with equality: otherwise, each website has an incentive to raise a bit its price. Therefore, the consumer will have no unilateral incentives to deviate if
In summary, conditional on that all websites of measure n adopt the business model of data sale, the equilibrium prices are such that for any pair of firms (j, k)
In the equilibrium, every consumer consumes all the websites.
In addition, we show in Appendix A that the price that each website will receive from selling its data to the brokerage market is equal to R (n). Namely, we provide a microfoundation for this result by assuming competition among any given number of symmetric brokerage firms.
Then, each website j's equilibrium payoff is given by
Now, consider the deviation of website j at stage 2 by adopting a pure content pricing business model. Upon such deviation, the payoff of website j is independent of other websites and is given by v j . Thus, all websites adopting the data sale business model is an equilibrium if
We thus have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose that n measure of websites entered at stage 1. If ψ(n , n) is concave in n and
, there is an equilibrium in which all websites adopt the business model of selling data to the data brokerage firm. In the equilibrium, (i) each website j with the content value v j charges
Free Entry
We have conducted an analysis the game that starts at stage 2 when a fixed measure of websites n entered the market at stage 1. We now study stage 1 by making the entry endogenous. Let n * be the equilibrium number of websites. Then, the marginal website's value to consumers v * is given by 1 − G(v * ) = n * . This implies that in the first stage, the extent of entry is determined by the following conditions.
Let us consider the optimal number of entrants from the social planner's viewpoint. Given the marginal cutoff type of entrant v, social welfare can be written as
The welfare-maximizing cutoff type v can be derived by the following first order condition.
Let v F B be the cut-off value in the first best outcome and let n F B = 1 − G(v F B ). Then, the condition for social optimum can be characterized by
The comparison of (4) and (5) reveals that the comparison of socially optimal number of websites and the market equilibrium boils down to the relative magnitudes of ψ (n) and ψ(n,n)−ψ(0,n) n . For instance, if ψ is convex, ψ is increasing, which implies that ψ (n) ≥ ψ(n, n)/n. Therefore, as long as ψ(0, n F B ) > 0, we have socially excessive entry.
Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 3 There is an excessive entry of websites (i.e., n * > n F B ) if the following condition holds
If ψ(n) is convex, there is excessive entry of websites.
To focus on the main driving force, consider the case in which ψ(n) is linear. Then, we have ψ(n F B , n F B )/n F B = ψ (n F B ) and therefore, the inequality (6) is always satisfied.
−ψ(0, n) represents the reservation utility of a consumer who does not use any website when all other consumers use all websites. Suppose that initially n F B measure of websites entered.
This reduces the reservation utility of a non-user from −ψ(0, 0) = 0 to −ψ(0, n F B ). Therefore, each marginal website can extract more than its social contribution by ψ(0, n F B )/n F B . This implies n * > n F B . In other words, the entry of some websites generate positive externalities to other websites who are contemplating their entry by worsening consumers' reservation utility, which generates socially excessive entry.
Note that the mechanism for our excessive entry result is very different from the standard business-stealing effect of Mankiw and Whinston (1986) . In our setup, there is no room for business stealing because we assumed that each website market is segmented and each website enjoyed complete monopoly power in its niche market. The excessive result in our model is coming from the negative information externalities, namely, each entrant's effect on consumers' reservation utility through the privacy channel.
To illustrate our results, consider the following parametric example in which we assume
ρ , where 0 < α < 1, ρ < 1, and κ is a scale parameter. It can be easily verified that ψ(x, n) is concave in x. 17 Note that this functional form implies that ψ(n, n) = ψ(n) = κn and ψ(0, n) = ξκn, where ξ = (1 − α)
and 0 < ξ < 1. As usual, with this CES nuisance cost function, α is the share parameter and ρ determines the degree of substitutability of one's own personal data and other people's data where the elasticity of substitution is given by σ = In the free-entry equilibrium, we also need to have
for the marginal entrant type. Using u * = 1 − n * under the uniform distribution over [0, 1], we have
In contrast, the socially optimal number of entrants is given by
Note that if r < κ, the revenue is smaller than the nuisance such that monetizing personal data is socially undesirable. However, if r > κ(1 − ξ), all websites adopt the business model of monetizing personal data and there is an excessive entry of such websites. The excessive entry region with excessive data use is represented in Figure 2 . First, our model formally shows the potential limitation of the current policy framework of the "informed consent model" or the notice-and-choice approach (MacCarthy, 2011). Indeed, the informed consent model is intuitively appealing. It is based on the premise that an individual's informed consent provides legitimacy for any information collection and use prac-tices. Yet, there has been wide criticism against the informed consent model. One primary critique is that privacy notices are rarely read, and even if read, not easy to be understood. 18
In our model, we show that even costless reading and perfect understanding of all privacy policies would not change the equilibrium characterization regarding the behaviors of data subjects and data collectors. In this sense, we provide a novel rationale for why the informed consent model cannot be effective. We do not resort to the very high cost of reading the policies or the vague description of the data use policy or consumer's lack of understanding of them. Instead, we find that the presence of negative privacy externalities can induce many consumers to voluntarily give their consent to the data collection and use. Therefore, our research has bearing on any data protection policy based on the informed consent model. and the other group of users did not give their consent. In the presence of negative privacy externalities, the latter group may find it better to give their consent as well when the former group already shared their personal data. This means that there could be a dynamic inconsistency problem depending on the extent of negative information externalities. So, when we interpret our static model from its dynamic perspective, it shows the potential dynamic unraveling of privacy loss.
Remarkably, our model can be applied to the presence of positive information externalities where more consumers find it desirable to share their information to the data controller as the service quality improves upon the size of information being shared. This potentially suggests that the more concentrated market structure may endogenously arise when there are economies of scale in data analytics. We believe that this is an interesting research topic in future.
A Reputation-Based Remedy Proposal

Options with the Same Price Constraint
Another interesting angle to view the case of Facebook and WhatsApp is to study when consumers would benefit from the data integration of multiple services. Recall that our model implicitly assumes that the data collectors cannot commit to the use of personal information as a welfare-enhancing device. This assumption was made deliberately but innocuously for our primary research goal: we focused on how rational consumers end up sharing their personal information voluntarily even though they correctly expected the adverse effect of such decision on their own utility. Now let us relax this assumption and provide a potential policy remedy that expands consumer choices and induces a monopoly data collector to build its reputation not to abuse its big data against consumers. Consider that the monopoly data collector with good reputation has the lower nuisance cost compared to the data collector with bad reputation. Then That is, we can construct an equilibrium where only good reputation firm would obtain the consent to integrated information, whereas the one with bad reputation cannot. Each consumer has an incentive to choose the option for the use of integrated personal information if and only if the firm has good reputation regardless of the choices made by other consumers.
Therefore, the proposed policy remedy induces consumers to coordinate on the better option according to the level of data collectors' reputation.
We will illustrate our policy recommendation with a monopoly situation and then discuss how it can be used for the case of many small websites.
An Example with a Monopoly with Two Content Services
Consider a monopoly which offers two different services and there is a mass one of homoge- In what follows, we focus on how the firm's reputation interacts with the nuisance depending on whether data are integrated or separated. Therefore, we assume that ψ I i (m; θ) strictly increases with m for i = 0, 1, 2 and for θ = g, b. 20 In addition, we assume
where the second line is assumed just to reduce the number of cases to be analyzed. We assume that R I (m; θ) increases with m.
20 Note that we can relax this assumption for θ = g such that the good websites provide positive benefits to consumers as more data are being collected; such consideration gives qualitatively the same result.
In the absence of any policy intervention, the monopoly firm will obtain the consent to use integrated personal data by charging p per service such that the following IR is satisfied with equality:
Under the above assumptions, this condition becomes equivalent to
So regardless of the reputation status, consumers end up consenting to integrated use of personal information as two potentially different prices.
Consider now the following remedy: the regulator forces the monopoly to provide an option to consent on the use of personal information without integrating information from both services at the same price as the option for the use of integrated personal information.
We introduce ψ S i (m; θ) and R S (m; θ) where S means separation of data and assume that they satisfy the same properties that ψ I i (m; θ) and R I (m; θ) do. In addition, let us assume
Basically, the good reputation means that the monopoly does not abuse the power from the integrated big data such that both the monopoly and the consumers benefit from the integrated data. Forcing the firm to offer such an option generates the following nice properties:
• For any given p, if the firm has good reputation, for each consumer it is a strictly dominant strategy to choose the integrated use of personal data between the two options, regardless of m;
• For any given p, if the firm has bad reputation, for each consumer, it is a strictly dominant strategy to choose the use of personal data without integration between the two options, regardless of m.
The proposed remedy allows consumers to coordinate on the best option between the two by following the dominant strategy. Hence, the firm with good reputation charges the above price and obtain the consent to use integrated data. The firm with bad reputation charges the following price and obtain consent to use data without integration;
Further Remarks
This kind of remedy can be applied to data sale with many websites. The regulator should force a website to offer an option to not to agree on data sale at the same price as the option to agree on data sale. Then, whenever consumers are concerned about data sale to some dubious source, it is a strictly dominant strategy to choose the option of no data sale.
Therefore, the remedy allows consumers to coordinate on the best option. As a response, any website who wants to sell data will have incentives to find a data broker with reputation not to abuse the delivered data.
There are two caveats. In order to create a permanent incentive to maintain good reputation, we should make the firm to obtain the consent on a regular basis. That is, consumers should be allowed to change the option they chose whenever they are worried about data abuse. This is because the firm may have incentive to abuse data after obtaining consent if the consent is permanent. If the proposed remedy provides incentives to build good reputation, consumers will consent on more gathering and use of big data, which in turn will be Pareto improving. Second, ψ 2 (m) can be decreasing for firms with good reputation. For instance, in the case of Google, 2u − ψ 2 (m) is net benefit from using search service and Gmail when Google uses big data for consumer benefit, which can be increasing with m. The above remedy is comprehensively applied to any case of positive impacts of data analytics for the firm with good reputation.
Conclusion
At this information age, our life-style is heavily dependent on all sorts of computerized devices such as computers, laptops, tablets and mobile phones of which the use is constantly producing data. Such data become so valuable that the so-called data broker industry has been fast-growing. Numerous websites and content providers offer their content for free or at a highly subsidized price in exchange for users' agreement to broad data use policy. Many data brokers are willing to purchase such personal data and sell them to many advertising and marketing companies who need the data for advertising advantages. As such, the harms and costs to individuals and society have risen as critical privacy issues.
In this paper we provide a model of privacy based on the idea of negative privacy externalities. Even if data collection requires consumers' consent and consumers are fully aware of the consequences of such consent, we show that the market equilibrium is characterized by excessive collection of personal information and the resulting loss of privacy by consumers compared to the social optimum. Therefore, we find that the current main privacy regulatory framework of the informed consent model may be ineffective to address the privacy concerns associated with the data broker industry.
To quote Schneier (p.238), " [d] ata is the pollution problem of the information age, and protecting privacy is the environmental challenge." As the pollution problem of the industrial age challenges us economists to come up with various policies-either market-oriented mechanisms or direct regulations-we now need to take a similar approach to the data surveillance problem. As pollutants have negative externalities and any preventive efforts such as abatement have the public good problem, the privacy protection in this big data world generates information externalities and the privacy protection may be viewed as a public good. We hope that our research provides a first-step in this direction of economics research.
[12] James Waldo, Herbert Lin, and Lynette I Millett. Engaging privacy and information technology in a digital age. National Academies Press, 2007.
A Appendix: A microfoundation of R(m)
Since the data broker market is extremely hidden from public knowledge in terms of their market structure, revenue and cost structure, and business practices, we adopted a reduce form approach by considering R(m) without further description of how it is determined. In this appendix, let us provide one particular micro-foundation to determine how much each website would obtain the revenue from the data sale to the data broker market. There are several remarks associated with the above lemma. First, suppose that one allows a deviation in which the deviating broker proposes a higher price but can limit the offer to only a certain number of first-arrived websites. Even so, there will be no profitable deviation. This is because, by charging a lower price, that broker cannot attract any website and by charging a higher price (say as close as B (m/n)), attracting more than m/n websites will still lead to a lower profit. Second, the lemma implies that there is no other symmetric NE in which all brokers charge a price lower than B (m/n). Third, there may exist another symmetric NE with prices higher than B (m/n). However, the equilibrium in the lemma will be Pareto-superior to any other symmetric equilibrium from the viewpoint of each brokerage firm.
Let us characterize R(m) = nB(m/n) so that R (m) = B (m/n). In this case, each website gets the profit of R (m). Let us first provide the condition in which a single website has no incentive to sell data if no other website sells data. Suppose that the website is the only who sells data. Let ε be the data amount of this website. Then, its profit from the data sale is approximately R (ε)ε. An individual consumer's IR constraint requires u − p − ψ(ε) ≥ ψ(0, ε).
Therefore the website has the overall profit of
Hence, we need to assume R (ε)ε + ψ(0, ε) < ψ(ε) for ε small enough.
; otherwise, this website will adopt the data sale model over the content pricing model.
Basically, we expect ψ(0, ε) is zero: a single website has no impact on the outside option.
Hence, a sufficient condition is R(ε) < ψ(ε) for ε small enough, which is the assumption we made in (3).
